Self-Organization of Balanced Nodes in Random Networks with Transportation Bandwidths

We apply statistical physics to study the task of resource allocation in random networks with limited bandwidths along the transportation links. The mean-field approach is applicable when the connectivity is sufficiently high. It allows us to derive the resource shortage of a node as a well-defined function of its capacity. For networks with uniformly high connectivity, an efficient profile of the allocated resources is obtained, which exhibits features similar to the Maxwell construction. These results have good agreements with simulations, where nodes self-organize to balance their shortages, forming extensive clusters of nodes interconnected by unsaturated links. The deviations from the mean-field analyses show that nodes are likely to be rich in the locality of gifted neighbors. In scale-free networks, hubs make sacrifice for enhanced balancing of nodes with low connectivity.Comment: 7 pages, 8 figure

Dynamics underlying Box-office: Movie Competition on Recommender Systems

We introduce a simple model to study movie competition in the recommender systems. Movies of heterogeneous quality compete against each other through viewers' reviews and generate interesting dynamics of box-office. By assuming mean-field interactions between the competing movies, we show that run-away effect of popularity spreading is triggered by defeating the average review score, leading to hits in box-office. The average review score thus characterizes the critical movie quality necessary for transition from box-office bombs to blockbusters. The major factors affecting the critical review score are examined. By iterating the mean-field dynamical equations, we obtain qualitative agreements with simulations and real systems in the dynamical forms of box-office, revealing the significant role of competition in understanding box-office dynamics.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure

Highlights from international workshops on therapeutic endoscopy (Hong Kong)

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Models of Financial Markets with Extensive Participation Incentives

We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate. Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge, reflecting the roles played by the arbitrageurs and trendsetters, and including a phase with irregular price trends and positive sums. The positive-sumness of the players' wealths provides participation incentives for them. Evolution and the bid-ask spread provide mechanisms for the gain in wealth of both the players and market-makers. New players survive in the market if the evolutionary rate is sufficiently slow. We test the applicability of the model on real Hang Seng Index data over 20 years. Comparisons with other models show that our model has a superior average performance when applied to real financial data.Comment: 17 pages, 16 figure